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CHAPTER IX 
FROM LABORATORY EXPERTISE TO LITIGATION:  
THE MUNICIPAL LABORATORY OF PARIS AND  
THE LONDON INLAND REVENUE LABORATORY, 
1870–1914 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
Alessandro STANZIANI and Peter ATKINS 
 
 
In our opinion, the history of food quality is closely related to the evolution 
of laboratory expertise, although not reducible to it. In this paper we wish to 
explore the connexions between the two in the period 1870-1914 and to 
compare and contrast the situations in London and Paris, Europe‘s two largest 
cities. We will feature the fight against food adulteration and a major portion of 
our argument will focus upon milk and wine, both controversial in terms of their 
―genuine‖ quality. 
In order to provide a basis for comparison, we will address three points. 
First, we will explore the designation of experts, the nature of their methods, 
and the imprimatur of their pronouncements.
1
 On the one hand, traders 
considered themselves as the best qualified people to judge product quality; for 
example, wine merchants in France stressed that only they had the required 
know-how to conclude that a wine has been falsified or not. In contrast, the 
municipal administration and a part of public opinion were favourable to a 
recourse to scientists, whose methods were presented as ―objective.‖ As such, 
the organoleptic analysis of traders stood against scientific chemical expertise.  
Second, to these conflicts between traders and scientists, we must add the 
question of disputes between the State and the municipalities. Because different 
municipal laboratories used different methods of analysis, the question arose of 
how to prevent meat that had, for instance, been rejected in Lyon or Liverpool 
being accepted in Paris or Portsmouth. The French response was to establish an 
official list of the methods of analysis valid for all municipal laboratories. 
                                                 
1 For discussions about the construction of expertise, see MacLeod, Government; and 
Ingold, Négocier la ville. 
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However, in the early twentieth century, strong centralization reversed previous 
policies: municipalities lost any control over the quality of food products. This 
was accompanied by a standardization of the methods of analysis. Several 
decrees fixed in detail the methods and the instruments of analysis. In Britain 
the system remained devolved and it was a combination of vigorous scientific 
communication about methodologies and a series of court cases that provided 
the basis for greater standardization.  
Third, we will argue that laboratory organization was important. The most 
extreme example is the investment in commercial laboratories undertaken by the 
large dairy companies that emerged in the late nineteenth century and which 
completely overshadowed the efforts of the central and local state on milk 
analysis. It was these ―industrial‖ laboratories that led the debate on 
compositional standards, particularly in Britain, and their scientific expertise 
held such weight that it influenced government policy and helped define what 
were to be considered ―natural‖ percentages of fat in milk.  
The paper begins with a brief introduction to the problem of adulteration, 
which proved to be a testing ground of scientific knowledge about food and of 
laboratory methods of analysis. This is followed by a discussion of the nature of 
expertise in food testing in the period 1870-1914. We review the establishment 
of the city laboratory in Paris as an example of contestation between seemingly 
incompatible political and commercial interests. Its status and organization are 
then compared with the system in London, which had a rather different mix of 
administrative and scientific motivations for food science. Finally, our 
conclusions suggest a direction for further work.  
 
 
The problem of food adulteration 
 
Food adulteration was a major social and economic issue in Europe in the 
nineteenth century. It was a scandal that inspired moral debate about dishonesty 
and the reasonable expectations of consumers. It raised economic issues about 
quality and the degree to which traders were justified in processing and 
manipulating natural constituents. It also sparked concerns about the toxic effect 
of the chemicals that were introduced into food in order to enhance a particular 
characteristic or to increase its shelf-life. It inspired critical literature and even 
black humour in satirical magazines such as Punch.
2
 In a sense, the debate that 
raged for a century or so from the 1820s was a precursor to the food scares of 
today. As a result, there was attention to scientific and technological expertise as 
                                                 
2 Long, ―Dickens.‖ 
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a means of establishing statements of authenticity, and also the exercise of state 
regulatory control for both prevention and policing. 
British interest in the falsification of food was first aroused in 1820, with 
revelations by Friedrich Accum.
3
 The public‘s attention span was short, 
however, and it was not until the 1850s that the well-publicised efforts of Arthur 
Hill Hassall and his ―Lancet Analytical Sanitary Commission‖ rekindled 
popular indignation.
4
 Meanwhile, Alphonse Chevallier was responsible for a 
similar surge of interest in France from 1850 and his book went into seven 
editions over the next half-century.
5
 A particular French concern with the 
plastering and watering of wine gave the issue momentum and contributed to 
the growth of a substantial scientific and polemical literature.  
Most countries in western Europe developed systems of food quality control 
in the second half of the nineteenth century. The first major city to establish a 
laboratory to investigate and pronounce on fraud was Brussels in 1856.
6
 Paris 
followed in 1878 but the situation in London was complex. The Sale of Food 
and Drugs Act of 1875 was the stimulus for London‘s local authorities to 
appoint their own analysts but the situation was confused because the central 
government also had its own laboratory.
7
 A comparison between Paris and 
London is valuable because of the different pace and nature of change in the two 
capitals. 
 
 
Expertise 
 
It will become obvious to readers of this book that there is a vast literature 
on expertise. In a sense this is an embarras de richesse because of the 
complexity of assumptions and disciplinary perspectives that have loaded much 
meaning into one word. We will not comment on the pioneering work by 
psychologists into the roles of learning and intelligence (human and artificial) in 
skill development and expertise but a brief introduction to the contribution of 
Science and Technology Studies will provide a starting point.
8
 This STS work 
derives impetus from the recent undermining of the authoritative voice of 
―experts‖ in food scares such as Mad Cow Disease (Bovine Spongiform 
                                                 
3 Accum, A Treatise on Adulteration of Food. See Burnett, Plenty and Want. 
4 Hassall, Food and Its Adulteration. 
5 Chevallier, Dictionnaire des altérations. 
6 Scholliers, ―Food, Fraud and the Big City.‖ 
7 Oddy, ―Food Quality in London.‖ 
8 For the work of psychologists and others, see Ericsson et al., The Cambridge Handbook 
of Expertise; and also Crease and Selinger, The Philosophy of Expertise. 
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Encephalopathy) or Genetically Modified Organisms. Ulrich Beck has even 
identified a challenge to the whole notion of expertise in the latest phase of 
modernity, which he calls the ―risk society.‖9  
Harry Collins has argued that understanding expertise is the foundation of a 
―third wave‖ of science studies, which seeks answers to the question ―how do 
you make decisions based on scientific knowledge before there is an absolute 
scientific consensus?‖ He asserts that this is ―the pressing intellectual problem 
of the age‖ because of the recent questioning of scientific authority, but we will 
argue in the present paper that there were similar problems of legitimacy in the 
past.
10
 The issues at hand are, first, the indeterminacy of standards—in this 
paper the quality of foodstuffs—and, second, the ferocious arguments that 
erupted around the solidification of standards (agreed or imposed) into the form 
of regulations and their enforcement through the law. In the period under review 
the debate was partly philosophical, about the relationship between food and 
nature, and partly about the degree to which the practical methods used by the 
food industry to make profit were socially and commercially acceptable. 
Michel Callon would have us call such debates ―hybrid forums,‖ where 
laboratory expertise mixes with ―recherche de plein air.‖11 He argues that both 
knowledge and democracy benefit from the controversies that form here like 
storms at a meteorological front. In today‘s extensive debates about the quality 
of food and drink, which have often taken on the guise of deliberative 
democracy, the interests of the consumer-citizen are at least represented, even if 
they are frequently overshadowed by the corporate power of the food industry; 
but in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries such voices were 
subdued. In fact, more often that not, we must ask in whose real interests food 
laws and regulations were established: those of the public or those of certain 
sections of the food producers, processors, manufacturers and retailers. 
Moreover, as we shall see, the historical experience in turn of the century France 
shows that the increasing attention devoted to ―experts‖ coincided with a decline 
in the political authority of Parliament, to the benefit of the power of the 
Executive. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Beck, Risk Society; Beck, World Risk Society; Mythen, Ulrich Beck.  
10 Collins and Evans, ―The Third Wave,‖ quotation on 241. For critiques and a response, 
see Gorman, ―Levels of Expertise;‖ Jasanoff, ―Breaking The Waves;‖ Rip, 
―Constructing Expertise;‖ Wynne, ―Seasick;‖ Collins and Evans, ―King Canute.‖ 
11 Callon and Rip, ―Humains, non humains;‖ Callon et al. Agir. 
 From Laboratory Expertise to Litigation 5 
 
Paris 
 
A general political tendency during the first years of the French Third 
Republic was to grant municipalities more power. It was in this context that the 
question of municipal laboratories arose. After the first International Congress 
of Hygiene and Demography held in Brussels in 1876 had highlighted the role 
that the municipal laboratory played in that city, the second Congress in Paris 
two years later stressed the need to organize similar laboratories in the main 
French towns. This was achieved in Paris in 1878, Le Havre 1879, Reims 1882, 
Rouen 1883, Saint-Etienne and Amiens 1884, and Pau 1885.
12
 In these units, 
medical doctors acted as statisticians and demographers; they were in charge of 
hygiene, vaccination and food safety problems. This was not only because of 
budgetary constraints but also because, according to the hygienist credo, 
prevention had to be ―global,‖ covering food habits, vaccination, housing, and 
general education. 
 We may ask whether these laboratories were primarily intended to serve 
traders (for example, wine retail merchants who were suspicious of the 
composition of the product they bought from wholesalers), consumers 
(complaining about retailers), or local authorities (the prefecture, the 
municipality in their campaign against adulterated products). We can also 
question whether they were supposed to protect public health (and thus the 
consumer) or to regulate competition (and, thus, the relationship between 
traders).
13
 In Paris, the organization of a municipal laboratory was at first 
conceived as a form of public control of the markets; as such, services of the 
municipal laboratory would not have been accessible to the public, only the 
police. This type of laboratory was agreed upon in 1878; however, there were 
protests from both traders and consumers and two years later the municipal 
laboratory and its activity became a public service. It aimed to solve the 
problem of increasing information asymmetries on the food market, and to do 
this the laboratory was accessible not only to the police and the prefecture, but 
also to private actors. This hybrid solution testified at the same time to the 
increasing involvement of both the central state and the municipalities in food 
matters and in economic activity generally, and also the aim of private economic 
actors to regulate contractual problems by appealing to a third party. 
The laboratory‘s budget quickly increased during the 1880s. In 1881, it 
made 3,958 analyses free of charge and 378 were paid for by private customers. 
                                                 
12 Du Mesnil, Bureaux municipaux d’hygiène; Stanziani, ―Municipal Laboratories.‖ 
13 For a further development of this point, see Stanziani, Histoire de la qualité, chapt. 13, 
315–361. 
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To this, one has to add 2,181 samples that municipal inspectors seized—that is 
6,517 analyses in total. In 1882, 5,188 analyses were free of charge, 50 for paid 
by private customers and 5,238 samples came from inspectors. In 1883 almost 
15,000 analyses were made. If we now distinguish by product, wine was the 
most analysed product: in 1883 almost half of the analyses (7,444) concerned 
wine, 5,280 of them free of charge (that is related to watering down), 283 paid 
for by private customers and 1,581 referred by inspectors. Second was milk: in 
1883 there were 4,172 analyses as a whole, including 491 free on the request of 
private individuals, 14 paying, and 3,667 from inspectors. 
The major importance devoted to wine and milk is above all an outcome of 
the private-public purpose of the laboratory. In fact, while wine inspection and 
analysis was often required by cabaretiers (publicans) and débitants (retailers) in 
order to protect themselves from litigation, milk analysis was mostly the result 
of the autonomous action of inspectors. This created indirect political pressure 
and gave milk and milk adulteration a mediating role in encouraging change. 
Despite the sharp increase in analyses, food inspection lagged behind: in 
1882, inspectors managed only 5,260 visits to markets, 17,626 to restaurants, 
grill rooms, dairies, wine merchants cellars, etc., 1,392 to pork-butchers, 3,460 
to butchers, 6,317 to grocers, 1,576 to breweries and coffee shops, and 4,347 to 
other places (bazaars, tanners, etc.).
14
 Controls were also limited in view of the 
size of Paris. For wine alone, every day the 16 to 20 inspectors sampled five 
bistros each. This meant that many bistros were never inspected in a year. 43 
inspectors dealt with butchers, and 20 with grocers, restaurants, etc; however 
they were not empowered to seize samples, only to destroy foodstuffs that were 
clearly unsuitable for consumption.
15
 Overall, the probability that a food or 
drink retailer would be visited was remote and the incentive to renounce fraud 
was low, unless his reputation for quality was well-established.  
This efficiency problem was related to another broader question: that is the 
rise of a national market and the local nature of rules and their enforcement. 
Different municipal laboratories used different methods of analysis, and the 
question arose of how to prevent food rejected in one city being accepted in 
another. The solution consisted in establishing an official view on methods of 
analysis valid for all the municipal laboratories; but this could only be done if 
these laboratories were submitted to state rather than municipal rules. This is to 
say that the creation of a national market for food was inseparable from that of 
national regulatory institutions. This was different for other goods, for example, 
manufactured products; not because they were ―naturally‖ standardized (despite 
                                                 
14 Girard, Documents concernant les falsifications. 
15 Hogg, ―De l‘organisation des inspections.‖ 
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the common impression this was hardly the case), but, first, because contractual 
litigation did not enter the public sphere (criminal, administrative rules) as it did 
for food and drink and, secondly, because foodstuffs and beverages were 
required not to be ―standardized‖ but ―normalized,‖ that is to have some stable 
characteristics (fixed in advance). Quality stabilization for manufactures was the 
result of a complex negotiation at both contractual and market institutional 
(professional association, chamber of commerce, law courts) levels, while for 
foodstuffs administrative and criminal sets of rules intervened and added to 
these other levels. 
On the supply side, economic agents mobilized different definitions of food 
quality and adulteration in order to gain a legal-institutional organization of the 
market, and thus the legal exclusion of a part of the competition. This is not to 
say that economic lobbies completely controlled the market rules. The related 
issues would have been impossible to reach without the role that food security 
played in the public debate of the time. The hygienist movement made an 
important contribution. Indeed, under the Third Republic, the influence of 
scientists increased in the National Assembly and hygiene became an issue 
throughout the political spectrum. 
Moreover, the way economic groups intervened in the public sphere and in 
the organization of expertise was closely linked to the broader institutional and 
political organization. Under the Third Republic, several scientists were elected 
and this was quite different from the preceding Second Empire, when, often 
excluded from political activity, scientists mobilized their knowledge as a clear 
political weapon. This also helps to explain the very complex attitude that 
scientists had with regard to business. It is commonplace to stress that French 
scientists criticized ―capitalism‖ and its prioritization of profits. This attitude 
was indeed quite widespread and became particularly evident during the major 
sanitary crisis (trichinosis, tuberculosis) of that time, as well as in the public 
debates about wine adulteration.  
However important, these attitudes were not the only ones and a majority of 
scientists (for instance, as a member of a consultative board or as an elected 
Deputy) considered that science and business had to walk hand in hand in order 
to find the most appropriate rules; that is rules balancing profits with trade 
transparency and health security. Some of these scientists were also members of 
economic associations (chambers of commerce, winegrowers unions, etc.) and, 
because of that, they were constantly accused of collusion by their colleagues. 
Scientists‘ varied attitudes to business are reflected in the debate about 
methods of analysis. For example, the addition of plaster in wine (beyond two 
grams per litre) had been forbidden in 1880, but, because of the protests of Midi 
winegrowers and traders (those most concerned), the application of this rule was 
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delayed. In 1886, the Ministry of Agriculture requested experts to assess the 
―real impact‖ of plaster on health. This Commission focused, not on this 
problem, but on the question of how to measure the quantity of plaster in wine. 
Two different procedures and instruments were available on the market: one 
patented by Pasteur the other by Berthelot and Fleurieu. Unfortunately, these 
different methods gave different results and, if the Pasteur method had been in 
use, most of the concerned wine would have been considered as ―legal,‖ while 
the second method would have led to its interdiction.
16
 This raised the basic 
problem (that in our own time still lingers with doping tests) of the measures 
and the instruments of expertise. The scientists developed different measures but 
were unable to agree upon a means of choosing one method or another. From 
this point of view scientific uncertainty and political mediation were constant 
components of market regulation via expertise. 
In other cases, traditional organoleptic analysis (tasting wine, smelling milk) 
of food professionals was set in opposition to chemical expertise. This mirrored 
the problem of quality measures for foodstuffs and drink: food traders stressed 
that, as these items were not standardized products, it was possible to conclude 
about adulteration only on the grounds of chemical analysis. For example, how 
could one demonstrate that an excess of water in wine (or in milk) was due to 
the producer rather than to ―nature‖? For their part, scientists sought to list the 
main components and acceptable values for every product. This supposed the 
possibility of establishing a correspondence between the standardization of 
products and of expertise; unfortunately, for most of our period, this was more a 
project than a reality. 
Organoleptic expertise was based on the experience and professional skill of 
food traders and wine merchants. However, such professional skill met 
increasing difficulties when confronted at the end of the nineteenth century with 
the wide use of organic chemistry. When they were defendants in a trial, traders 
maintained they were not scientists and, as such, could not identify artificial 
substances in wine or other ―natural‖ products. But, at the same time, they 
argued that ―natural‖ products such as wine could not be evaluated only by 
chemical analysis. Scientists might confuse bad vintages with adulterated 
products. On these grounds, traders and professional associations criticized the 
stance of the Paris laboratory in identifying upper and lower limits for several 
components of wine beyond which adulteration was presumed.
17
  
Because of such criticisms, the Ministry of the Interior asked the Director of 
the laboratory, Charles Girard, and the Prefect for a detailed report. In this 
                                                 
16 [Anon.], ―Analyse chimique des vins.‖ 
17 AN F 12 7417, ―Feuilles d‘analyse du laboratoire de Paris.‖ (janvier 1884) 
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Girard denied the fact that the laboratory made use only of chemical analysis for 
wine, pointing out that tasting (dégustation) was also used, particularly for the 
top rank wines. His concern was not just with food safety but also with 
adulteration. He displayed a contempt for the profit motive of capitalist food 
industry and advocated the disclosure of detailed information about the 
composition of foods. Here we need to make a distinction between two different 
phases in product quality: ex-ante (information on labels or in contracts) and ex-
post (laboratory analysis). Girard entered the ex-ante debate but he and his 
laboratory were responsible only for ex-post problems of evaluating already 
sold products. His attitudes gave traders a solid basis for their complaints and 
led the debate on to the legal value of expertise. As the Prefect explained in his 
report, the laboratory was just a simple source of information and its analyses 
constituted only indices of presumption, not clear evidence for legal 
judgements.
18
 As to the judges: this did not imply that they had to acquire 
scientific training or competence. Expertise expressed technical concerns but 
also contained a conclusion expressed in legal terms: adulterated wine or milk. 
After that the judge had to attribute responsibility, and here expert analysis was 
only one element among many because it could not say anything about who had 
adulterated the product. 
Despite attempts to defuse the debate, criticisms did not stop and even 
increased, to the extent that some judges in the 1890s raised doubts about using 
laboratory analyses, even as simple indices.
19
 This was so because the chemical 
analysis of foodstuffs and wine still faced serious difficulties in the accuracy 
and stability of its observations. For example, the watering down of wine cannot 
be detected if the added water is below 20 per cent of the volume.
20
  
In 1896 a special Commission was set up at the Ministry of Finance. It was 
charged with an attempt to identify standard criteria for analyzing wines and 
alcohol generally. It was not by chance that this Commission was formed only 
of scientists, with no representative of the business associations.
21
 This was an 
attempt made by civil servants both to reduce contestation and to coordinate 
different branches of the administration (that is municipal as well as different 
ministry laboratories). Science was supposed to be the strong unifying and 
legitimising factor. 
                                                 
18 AN F 12 7417, ―Préfecture de Police au Ministre du Commerce.‖ (9 mars 1883) 
19 AN BB 18 6025, ―Lettre du Préfet de Paris au Ministre de l‘Intérieur.‖ (18 mars 1895) 
20 Ibid. 
21 AN F 12 7417***(not 68 etc.), ―Décret du Président de la République sur la 
Constitution d‘une Commission d‘Expert auprès du Ministère des Finances.‖ (25 
september 1883) 
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The Commission indicated the most appropriate methods of analysis but it 
added that administrative expertise as practised in municipal and fiscal 
laboratories was only one piece of evidence, among others, in a judicial trial. 
Guilt could only be attributed on the grounds of several concomitant factors 
(letters, accounts, testimonies). These suggestions left unsolved the problem of 
the institutional setting in which the standardization of expertise had to be 
placed: should municipalities be left in charge of these services? How were 
local and central institutions to be coordinated? 
These questions deeply affected not only the economic dynamics but also 
the institutional equilibrium of the Third Republic and in particular the 
relationship between municipalities and the central state. The tensions were such 
that the Commission‘s recommendations were not translated into rules until, at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, a new general law on fraud and 
falsification laid out a basis for expertise. This general law on food adulteration 
of 1905 was followed in July 1906 by a Ministerial Decree confirming the 
creation of a new Service for the Repression of Frauds at the Ministry of 
Agriculture. The decree detailed the organization of laboratories and their 
methods of analysis. Still the relationship between these new central laboratories 
and the previous municipal laboratories had to be clarified: should the municipal 
laboratories be curtailed, and, if not, should they be dependant on the Ministry 
of Agriculture? 
A circular issued by this Ministry stated that municipal laboratories could 
survive only by agreement and, then, under the control of the Minister of 
Agriculture.
22
 This meant that, unlike in the first years of the Third Republic, 
now the balance of power had shifted from municipalities towards the central 
government. The reform was not without its problems; the Paris laboratory, in 
particular, refused to submit to the Service of Repression of Fraud and contested 
the value of its selected methods of analysis. The result was that the Ministry 
denied the laboratory official status and the courts refused to take its analyses 
into consideration.
23
 
Of course this issue only concerned administrative law expertise. Other 
forms of expertise were available in different contexts. In particular, judicial 
contre-expertise in law courts could not be standardized nor practised by 
officials but only by ―assermentés‖ experts who were free to choose their 
methods. This was so because officials were considered as ―involved parties‖ 
                                                 
22 AN BB 18 6055, ―Note interne du Ministère de la Justice.‖ (no date). 
23 Décrets du 19 mars 1907 (Journal Officiel, 7 avril 1907) et du 13 juin 1907 (Journal 
Officiel du 20 juin 1907); AN BB 18 6031, ―Rapport du Procureur Général de la 
Cour de Cassation au Ministre de la Justice.‖ (27 avril 1909) 
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and also because, precisely because experts could not be chosen from among 
state officials, they could not impose any methods. 
Last but not least, private product expertise was developed in order to satisfy 
the increasing needs of business to control product or semi-product quality to 
avoid litigation. This development also responded to the evolution of contractual 
responsibilities. At the turn of the century, the legal invention of the consumer 
went along with that of the ―professional.‖ The rights of the former where 
protected when challenging the quality of a product or even when the purchase 
of an adulterated product was the result of ignorance. In both cases it was the 
responsibility of the professional to take care to evaluate the product, applying 
expertise where necessary. Here analyses mostly acted as a check on negligence 
rather than as proof of a guilty action, because, for that, further official expertise 
was required. 
 
 
London 
 
The situation in England and Wales was similar in some ways to Paris and 
different in other important respects. Laboratory expertise was fragmented and 
of uncertain authority. First, there were local authorities in London and in some 
of the larger industrial cities such as Manchester and Liverpool that took it upon 
themselves to establish means of detecting food frauds from the middle of the 
nineteenth century onwards. It is important to note that these initiatives were 
limited in scope: (a) at first to microscopic and physical analysis, (b) to the most 
adulterated foods, such as milk, and (c) with little or no impact upon small 
towns and rural areas until the end of the century. Second, laboratories were set 
up in the 1870s and 1880s by some of the larger food companies, although their 
work was more concerned with the quality of supplies to their factories than 
with protection for the consumer. In 1881 in London, the Aylesbury Dairy Co., 
for instance, began taking 10-20,000 samples of milk a year and gradually they 
built up the world‘s largest database of information about dairy products. Third, 
the official laboratory was in Somerset House, London, and was known 
variously as the Board of Inland Revenue Chemical Laboratory (1849-1894), 
the Government Laboratory (1884-1911), and the Government Chemist‘s 
Department (1911-1959). For our present purposes, this laboratory derived its 
power from the 1875 Sale of Food and Drugs Act and acted as a chemical Court 
of Appeal, sitting in judgment upon the efforts of local authority analysts. There 
had been previous Acts in 1860 and 1872 that had been ineffective. 
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Analysts could be appointed under the 1860 Act, but at the local level this 
was not compulsory until 1899.
24
 Their professional interests were looked after 
by the Society of Public Analysts (SPA), which from the outset developed into a 
focus of opposition to Somerset House. A trader convicted of food fraud could 
appeal and the Government Laboratory was the final arbiter. They frequently 
overturned the results of Local Authority analysts and this led to a great deal of 
friction. In the case of milk, for instance, it was in as many as a half of cases that 
Somerset House prevailed.
25
 The SPA accused government scientists of being 
unqualified and of using inappropriate methods of analysis. Disputes frequently 
spilled over into the trade press and sometimes even into popular newspapers. 
The editor of Food and Sanitation, for instance, praised the approach adopted in 
Paris but was bitterly critical of Somerset House. In 1894 he spoke of the 
―wretched, ignorant, and utterly untrustworthy system of food analysis at 
Somerset House‖. It was a ―poor, bungling department struggling to perform 
work for which it has not got the skill or knowledge‖. In his opinion, 
―scientifically the Somerset House chemists are dead, and there exists no 
shadow of an excuse for their remaining unburied.‖26 
There were in essence two problems here, equally relevant in both Paris and 
London: definitions of the ―natural,‖ and the ―knowability‖ of the world through 
laboratory science. First, food is, of course, organic and therefore variable in its 
qualities through both time and space. But eliminating fraudulent foodstuffs by 
defining the compositional characteristics found in the ―genuine‖ article proved 
to be exceptionally difficult in our study period. There are seasonal variations, 
and also differences from district to district, and sometimes even from field to 
field. Anyone familiar with the wonderful complexities of wine vintages knows 
this from subtle differences in taste that are the result, not just of the grapes used 
and the methods of fermentation and storage, but also of soil and micro-climate. 
With milk, there were attempts on both sides of the Channel to state the 
acceptable constituents. In Paris in 1897 a Municipal Commission concluded 
that this should be 3.0 per cent butterfat and 8.5 per cent solids non fat, the same 
as the British Sale of Milk Regulations in 1901.
27
 The neat congruence is 
deceptive, however, because the previous decade had seen heated debates about 
―genuine‖ milk and what it was reasonable to ask of farmers. In London, 
participants included (a) the dairy lobby, who pointed to seasonal alternations of 
rich and ―thin‖ milk; (b) local authority public analysts, who wanted a high 
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standard; and (c) Somerset House, who, without consultation, implemented a 
low standard. It was only with detailed empirical agronomic research in the 
early twentieth century that it was possible to put this issue on the sounder 
footing of observed regularities. 
Second, food science matured in the second half of the nineteenth century 
with developments in organic chemistry. There had been delays earlier because 
of the difficulty of dealing with organic materials in a precise manner. Accuracy 
was important for deriving quality standards but, in the case of milk, use of the 
―lactometer‖ from about 1800 proved to be most unsatisfactory. The instrument 
was a modified hydrometer that floated in a milk sample, and the specific 
gravity (weight per volume) inferred from the volume of displacement was an 
indication of whether the milk had been tampered with by watering, or was 
whole and therefore natural. In reality lactometers were far from fool-proof. For 
instance, cream decreases the density of milk and a sample‘s specific gravity 
can therefore readily be manipulated by skimming part of the cream to raise the 
density and then adding water to reduce it back to the original reading. 
The application of chemical techniques to food analysis increased from the 
1870s. However, there was fierce rivalry between the proponents of different 
techniques and significant scientific disagreements emerged about the validity 
of the methods and their results.  
Building a scientific consensus about ―genuine‖ food and about the methods 
of detecting fraud was achieved in four ways. First, food chemistry came to be 
increasingly dominated by industrial interests. It was they who invested the 
most in testing and in the creation of industrial-scale databases of observations 
under all possible conditions. Quantification and standardized laboratory 
protocols were intended to establish ―technologies of trust‖ in controversial 
areas. Thus the series of daily milk samples established a number of features of 
cow biology that had not previously been understood. First, genuine milk was 
discovered to be highly variable in its constituents due to a wide range of 
factors. Second, the early, rather simplistic, focus on butter fat had distorted the 
industry‘s understanding of genuine milk and encouraged farmers to engineer a 
regression to an annual mean for that ingredient, to the neglect of other 
elements. 
Corporate capitals and initiatives were dominant. In the year 1924, the 
London laboratories of the United Dairies examined seven times more samples 
of milk and cream than all of the local authorities in England and Wales put 
together.
28
 Henry Droop Richmond, who was Analyst to the Aylesbury Dairy 
Company for twenty years, in his laboratories alone processed 330,000 samples. 
                                                 
28 Maggs, ―The organization of United Dairies (Ltd).‖ 
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Along with Express Dairies, the Cooperative Wholesale Society, and a number 
of others, these companies dominated research. Few textbooks were available at 
the turn of the century and Richmond led the field, in Britain at least, with his 
The Laboratory Book of Dairy Analysis (three editions: 1905, 1912, 1925) and 
his Dairy Chemistry (five editions: 1899, 1914, 1920, 1942, 1953), the latter of 
which was described as ―the reference book‖ for all analysts.29 
Second, methods of testing and laboratory expertise were increasingly 
geared to the expense and timeliness of techniques of analysis. This was more 
important than the ultimate degree of precision that could be achieved. For milk, 
the Babcock technique was a favourite in the 1890s, where sulphuric acid was 
used to dissolve everything in the milk except the fat. The mixture was then 
rapidly rotated in a centrifuge to separate the fat and a percentage figure could 
be read off on the graduated neck of the special bottle provided. The time 
whirling the samples tied up the expensive equipment, however, and the Gerber 
acido-butyrometry method eventually triumphed because of the convenience of 
its apparatus.
30
 
Third, both industrial and state chemistry came to rely upon impartial third 
parties to provide a gloss of objectivity to their work. In 1900 the newly 
established National Physical Laboratory (NPL) was called in to guarantee the 
accuracy of Gerber bottles and subsequently they became pre-eminent in the 
standardization of equipment and techniques generally. The bottles soon were 
an important element in the income stream of the NPL and may therefore be 
fairly said to have had a central role in its early years. Gerber bottles were vital 
to the dairy industry, not only to monitor quality and reduce adulteration but 
also to reassure farmers who sold their milk to butter factories that they were 
being paid sufficient for the fat content of their milk.
31
 
Fourth, deployment of the law was crucial.
32
 In fact, it was through the 
application of the anti-adulteration laws that scientific expertise was most 
severely tested. As Porter observes, ―courts have been particularly stubborn in 
believing that science should mean the straightforward application of general 
laws to particular circumstances‖.33 Golan shows how this attitude evolved, with 
particular reference to expert testimony in the Anglo-Saxon common law 
tradition.
34
 But scientific expertise is in reality more complex and less certain 
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than the expectations of the law, with the result that ―the testimony of real living 
scientists often holds up rather badly in the adversarial courtroom situation‖ and 
―research done according to the standards of scientists is often not impersonal 
and law-like enough to stand up to political and judicial scrutiny.‖35 As a result, 
the science of food analysis had to adjust to the requirements of the law and 
lawyers if convictions were to be obtained and adulteration eliminated. 
Laboratories had to be run with reference to methods of analysis known to be 
acceptable to the courts, and at levels of efficiency in the processing of samples 
and the reporting of results that would stand up in court. Local authority 
inspectors had to become authoritative and personable ―experts,‖ who could 
―perform‖ convincingly in the courtroom, and behind whom there was an 
administrative and scientific weight that was beyond question.  
The gradual accumulation of case law after the Sale of Food and Drugs Acts 
of 1860, 1872, 1875, 1879, 1899 and 1928, and the issue by successive 
governments of regulations and explanatory circulars, fostered a changing 
understanding of the thresholds of legality with regard to food. However, the 
law was unable to eliminate the fuzziness of science. On the contrary, it 
revealed, in its pedantic reverence of the statutory text, uncertainties that no-
one, from farmer to retailer to scientist, had ever foreseen. It also created 
injustice by convicting innocent parties and acquitting the guilty; it undermined 
informal trust that had existed in the trade for decades and encouraged the 
substitution of complex contractual obligations; and the legal profession 
flourished on a rash of milk cases (Table 1) that eventually, by their sheer 
number and high profile, led to political consequences.  
 
 
Table 1. Issues in milk litigation in Britain, 1870-1914 
 
 Warranty - written undertaking that milk would be whole and untampered with. 
 Appeal to the cow—poor milk legal if shown to be unadulterated. 
 Grigg v. Smith (1917) - no need for milk to be the outcome of an entire or 
uninterrupted milking 
 
By 1914 much of the heat had gone out of the dispute between the SPA and 
what by now was called the Government Chemist‘s Laboratory. This was 
because the methodology of milk analysis was broadly agreed upon and the 
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controversy had shifted to the courts and the politics were now between 
farmers‘ representatives and the legislators.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
What then is expertise and how was it deployed in our case studies? We 
suggest that expertise in the regulatory situations under scrutiny was a set of 
constructions of goal-orientated knowledge that were deployed in laboratories, 
in courts and in the corridors of power, in order to achieve the insertion of 
rational ordering and standardization of the food supply. This is not to deny a 
distributed expertise among members of the public and even among the actors 
responsible for adulteration, but historians have generally found these more 
difficult to study because of dearth of relevant source material.
36
 
The process of urbanization was connected to the rise of national markets in 
both countries, and also with the number of intermediaries and the complexity 
of the supply chain. Together with the entry of chemistry into agribusiness 
production, this raised serious information asymmetry problems, and sometimes 
it even challenged already established agreements on the definition of product 
quality. This situation of generalized uncertainty fuelled attempts made by 
economic lobbies to conquer market share by turning legal rules and market 
institutions to their own profitable advantage. This was mostly done by 
influencing official definitions of the quality/adulteration of a given product, 
which, in turn, made possible the exclusion of some of their competitors from 
the market. Although the legislative and regulatory frameworks were somewhat 
different between France and England, in both countries the evidence seems to 
suggest that commercial interests were dominant. 
It was in this context that the question of product expertise arose. In London, 
as in Paris, different interests of economic association, as well as a lack of 
coordination with organs of the central state, encouraged municipalities to offer 
their own services for food inspection and analysis. In France, this fitted with 
the broader tendency in the first years of the Third Republic of decentralizing 
powers to municipalities. Municipal laboratories came to supply this service to 
both the public, and to official and private contractors. As such, public expertise 
was submitted to the same critique as private transactions, and organoleptic 
expertise was opposed to chemical analysis. This tension was between two 
criteria of product evaluation, two notions of the law (one close to 
administrative-police rules the second to judicial law) and, last but not least, to 
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two different forms of intersection between economics and the law. Scientific 
analysis led to macro forms of regulation, while organoleptic expertise was 
much more anchored to micro contractual arrangements. 
In France, unlike other European countries (for example Great Britain or 
Germany) these confrontations were solved by the victory of standardized 
expertise over the organoleptic, and the state took over the power of 
municipalities with regard to food control. This process went along with the 
evolution of food security and food quality rules from civil and/or penal versus 
administrative penal rules. This was part of a broader transformation (to which it 
contributed too) of the Third Republic from local to highly centralized forms of 
power. 
In contrast, in Britain, centralization was much less pronounced than in 
France and, more important, was different in character. Product quality was 
increasingly linked in our period to a series of centrally defined rules that were 
negotiated by civil servants and representatives of the food industry. These were 
empowered by a combination of laws and official regulations, which were then 
tested and enforced by the courts, starting at the local level in the magistrate‘s 
courts and, in a small number of cases, appealed to the High Court. As a result, 
commercial and administrative rules and legal debate were inevitably bound 
together; but it is important to repeat and emphasise the contestation that was 
built in to such a system. Because of disagreements between experts of the same 
background and between the expertises of traders, scientists, administrators and 
lawyers, our period has a rich literature and series of case law precedents to 
draw upon for research. There were also differences across space within 
jurisdictions, especially in the administratively more diverse English system of 
governance.  
It is our contention that further comparative research is required on food 
quality in order to understand, not only these varied and contingent histories, but 
also the common principles that underlie the European experience.
37
 Many 
countries followed the approaches of Britain or France but even those that 
created their own notions of quality had much in common as a result of the 
standardizing power of laboratory expertise.  
 
WORKS CITED 
 
                                                 
37 For an idea of the methodological basis upon which such comparison can be made, see 
the thorough and informative treatment of agricultural chemistry in France and 
Germany in this period by Jas, Au carrefour de la chimie et de l’agriculture. 
18 Chapter IX. Alessandro STANZIANI and Peter ATKINS 
 
Primary sources 
Archives Nationales, Paris (AN) 
F 12 (Ministry of Industry and Trade) 6873: Alcohols and wines. 
F 12 7417: Laboratoire municipal de Paris. 
BB 18 (Ministry of Justice, Criminal division) 6025: Plastered wines. 
BB 18 6031: Appellations d‘origine. 
BB 18 6055: Law of 1905. 
 
Journal Officiel 
Food and Sanitation 
[Anon.] ―Analyse chimique des vins du département de la Gironde, vins rouges 
de la récolte de 1888 et vins blancs de la récolte de 1887.‖ Bulletin du 
ministère de l'Agriculture 6 (1889): 510–530. 
Accum, Friedrich. A Treatise on Adulteration of Food and Culinary Poisons 
(..).and the Methods of Detecting Them. London: Longmans, 1820. 
Budin, Pierre. Commission municipale d’étude de l’alimentation par le lait. 
Rapport général. Paris: Imprimerie municipale, 1897. 
Chevallier, Alphonse. Dictionnaire des altérations et falsifications des 
substances alimentaires, médicamenteuses et commerciales. Paris: 
Béchet, 1850. 
Du Mesnil, Octave. Bureaux municipaux d’hygiène. Rapport sur leur mode 
d’organisation et de fonctionnement. [Offprint of Recueil des travaux du 
Comité consultatif, vol. XVI.] Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1886. 
Girard, Charles. Documents sur les falsifications des matières alimentaires et 
sur les travaux du laboratoire municipal. Deuxième rapport pour la 
Préfecture de Police. Paris: G. Masson, 1887. 
Hassall, Arthur. Food and its adulterations: comprising reports of the Analytical 
Sanitary Commission of `The Lancet’ for the years 1851-1854. London: 
Longmans, 1855. 
Hogg, Dr. ―De l‘organisation de l‘inspection des substances 
alimentaires.‖ Revue d’Hygiène et de Police Sanitaire (1881): 431–450. 
National Physical Laboratory. Regulations for the Examination of Lister-Gerber 
and Other Similar Milk Testing Apparatus. [Teddington: National 
Physical Laboratory], 1903. 
 
Secondary sources 
Atkins, Peter J. ―Laboratories, Laws and The Career of a Commodity.‖ 
Environment & Planning D: Society & Space 25 (2007): forthcoming. 
Atkins, Peter J., Peter Lummel and Derek J. Oddy (eds). Food and the City in 
Europe since 1800. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007. 
 From Laboratory Expertise to Litigation 19 
 
Bauman, Zygmunt. Modernity and Ambivalence. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1991. 
Beck, Ulrich. Risk Society: Towards A New Modernity. London: Sage, 1992. 
Beck, Ulrich. World Risk Society. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999. 
Burnett, John. Plenty and Want: A Social History of Diet in England from 1815 
to the Present Day. London: Nelson, 1966. 
Callon, Michel, Pierre Lascoumes and Yannick Barthe. Agir dans un monde 
incertain: essai sur la démocratie technique. Paris: Le Seuil, 2001.  
Callon, Michel and Arie Rip. ―Humains, non-humains: morale d'une 
coexistence.‖ La terre outragée: les experts sont formels! edited by 
Jacques Theys and Bernard Kalaora: 140–156. Paris: Éditions 
Autrement, 1992. 
Collins, Harry M. and Robert J. Evans. ―The Third Wave of Science Studies: 
Studies of Expertise and Experience.‖ Social Studies of Science 32 
(2002): 235–296.  
—. ―King Canute Meets the Beach Boys: Responses to the Third Wave.‖ Social 
Studies of Science 33 (2003): 435–452. 
Crease, Robert and Evan Selinger (eds). The Philosophy of Expertise. New 
York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2006. 
Dumoulin, Laurence. ―La médecine légale aux fondements de l'expertise 
judiciaire: de l'activité de médecin légiste à la profession d'expert.‖ In 
Special issue ―Homo criminalis: pratiques et doctrines médico-légales 
(XVIe-XXe siècles),‖ edited by Vincent Barras and Michel Porret. 
Équinoxes 22 (1999): 65–77.  
Dyer, Bernard and Mitchell, Charles A. The Society of Public Analysts and 
Other Analytical Chemists: some reminiscences of its first fifty years and 
a review of its activities. Cambridge: Heffer, 1932. 
Edmond, Gary (ed). Expertise in Regulation And Law. Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2004. 
Ericsson, Karl A., Neil Charness, Paul J. Feltovich, and Hoffman, Robert R. ( 
eds). The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.  
French, Michael and Jim Phillips. Cheated Not Poisoned? Food Regulation in 
the United Kingdom, 1875-1938. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2000. 
Golan, Tal. Laws of Men and Laws of Nature: The History of Scientific Expert 
Testimony in England and America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004. 
Gorman, Michael. ―Levels of Expertise and Trading Zones.‖ Social Studies of 
Science 32 (2002): 933–938. 
20 Chapter IX. Alessandro STANZIANI and Peter ATKINS 
 
Hierholzer, Vera. ―The ‗war against food adulteration‘: municipal food 
monitoring and citizen self-help associations in Germany, 1870s–1880s.‖ 
In Food and The City in Europe, edited by Peter Atkins et al., 2007 
(forthcoming). 
Hughes, E. B. ―Pure Food For The People: The Manufacturers‘ Contribution.‖ 
In Pure Food and Pure Food Legislation: Papers of the 1960 Centenary 
Conference, edited by A. J. Amos: 21–39. London: Butterworths, 1960. 
Ingold, Alice. Négocier la ville: projet urbain, société et fascisme à Milan. 
Paris: Éditions de l‘École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 2000. 
Jas, Nathalie. Au carrefour de la chimie et de l’agriculture: les sciences 
agronomiques en France et en Allemagne, 1850-1914. Paris: Éditions 
des archives contemporaines, 2000. 
Jasanoff, Sheila. ―Breaking the Waves in Science Studies.‖ Social Studies of 
Science 33 (2003): 389-400. 
Long, William F. ―Dickens and The Adulteration of Food.‖ The Dickensian 84 
(1988): 160–70. 
MacLeod, Roy (ed). Government and expertise: specialists, administrators and 
professionals, 1860-1919. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988. 
Maggs, Joseph H. ―The organization of United Dairies (Ltd).‖ In Proceedings of 
the World’s Dairy Congress, Washington DC, October 2, 3, Philadelphia 
PA, October 4, Syracuse NY, October 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 1923, edited by L. A. 
Rogers and K. D. Lenoir (eds): 235–41. Vol. 1. Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1924. 
Mythen, Gabriel. Ulrich Beck: A Critical Introduction To The Risk Society. 
London: Pluto Press, 2004.  
Oddy, Derek J. ―Food Quality in London and The Rise of the Public Analyst, 
1870–1939.‖ In Food and The City in Europe, edited by Peter Atkins et 
al., 2007 (forthcoming). 
Porter, Theodore M. Trust In Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and 
Public Life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995. 
Rip, Arie. ―Constructing Expertise In A Third Wave of Science Studies?‖ Social 
Studies of Science 33 (2003): 419–434. 
Scholliers, Peter. ―Food Fraud and The Big City: Brussels‘ Responses to Food 
Anxieties in The Nineteenth Century.‖ In Food and The City in Europe, 
edited by Peter Atkins et al., 2007 (forthcoming). 
Stanziani, Alessandro. Histoire de la qualité alimentaire, 1870-1914. Paris: Le 
Seuil, 2005.  
Stanziani, Alessandro. ―Municipal Laboratories and the Analyses of Foodstuffs 
in France under the Third Republic: A Case Study of the Paris Municipal 
 From Laboratory Expertise to Litigation 21 
 
Laboratory, 1878–1907.‖ In Food and The City in Europe, edited by 
Peter Atkins et al., 2007 (forthcoming). 
Wynne, Bryan. ―Seasick On The Third Wave? Subverting The Hegemony of 
Propositionalism.‖ Social Studies of Science 33 (2003): 401–417. 
